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Introduction 
In what ways do changes in economic and social policies result in changes in patterns of crime, 
victimisation and anxieties about crime? How do shifts in social values affect national-level 
experiences and beliefs about crime and appropriate responses to it (such as support for punitive 
punishments like the death penalty)? What roles might political institutions and the processes 
associated with them play in unpacking these changes? What have been the long-term 
consequences of neo-conservative and neo-liberĂůƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů
justice system and the general experience of crime amongst its citizens? What lessons might we be 
able to extract from an analysis of the recent past? These are some of the key motivating questions 
behind a recently-commenced ESRC-funded research project.  
The goals of this paper (and the project from which it is drawn more generally) are first and 
foremost to understand the long-term trajectory of crime rates alongside relevant political, social 
and economic developments and interventions. In so doing we will need to pay particular attention 
to both neo-liberal and neo-conservative strands of thinking and to their ideational and institutional 
instantiation in criminal justice policy since the 1980s (Hay, 1996, Hay and Farrall 2014). We hope to 
chart the development of crime and criminal justice policy generally as well as exploring the impact 
of the growing existence and tolerance of economic inequalities since the 1970s on a range of key 
processes related to crime (such as unemployment or growing levels of economic inequality). In this 
way we will be able to throw light on to the long term impact of the reorientation of social and 
economic policies on experiences of crime and associated phenomena. Such an examination will be 
crucial in developing a wider understanding of what drives changes in crime rates. Might they be due 
to the results of dramatically breaking with a previous political consensus and embracing a new, 
ƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŽŶĞ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇ ‘EĞǁ ZŝŐŚƚ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĞƐ ) ?ŽƌƚŽ
changes in, for example, the composition of the population or the adoption of crime prevention 
measures? Or some combination of all of these (and other factors)?   
This paper outlines our initial thinking on the matters which we will need to grapple with, and 
describes some of our thoughts as to how best to approach the research and writing projects 
associated with it. We commence with some background from research into the roles which recent 
social and political transformations have played in changing crime rates. We then devote a not 
inconsiderable section of our paper to outlining and reviewing some critiques of historical 
institutionalism, before outlining constructivist institutionalism. We then briefly outline the 
methodological matters which these approaches suggest before starting to outline how this thinking 
may develop our position with regards to the impact of Thatcherite social and economic policies on 
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crime rates. Such a discussion raises further important issues (about the levels and speeds of 
explanation most appropriate) which we then explore before we bring our paper to a close.  
 
The Criminological Background 
Over the past couple of decades, a number of seminal criminological works have started to explore 
the nature of the relationship between the cultural and social changes which have taken place since 
the end of the Second World War and the experience of crime since the 1970s. Key amongst such 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶ:ŽĐŬzŽƵŶŐ ?ƐThe Exclusive Society (1 ? ? ? ) ?ĂǀŝĚ'ĂƌůĂŶĚ ?ƐThe Culture of 
Control  ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚ>ŽŝĐtĂĐƋƵĂŶƚ ?ƐPunishing the Poor (2009). Whilst all have substantial merit, 
each has a tendency:  
x To make little reference to specific policies or how these may have shaped crime and 
experiences of it (thus making it hard to extract policy messages); 
x To say little about specific administrations (to quote Loader & Sparks, 2004:17 on Garland 
 “ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽŽƚŽƉĚŽǁŶ ?ĂŶĚŝŶ&ĞĞůĞǇ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ “ĂŶĐŚŽƌĞĚŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
x To focus on macro-level analyses of the UK (and the USA) in such a way that important details 
are often overlooked and the subtle differences between administrations and countries are 
downplayed;  
x To highlight the role and experiences of the middle class, without fully appreciating that working 
class people were also affected by these changes (perhaps even to a greater extent); and, finally, 
x To give primacy to theoretical rather than empirical considerations to the extent that few claims 
are subjected to rigorous data analyses.  
 
An additional aim of our project, therefore, is to produce a more accurate and empirically-grounded 
assessment of the effects of political conflict and policy formulation, thereby moving forward 
debates in criminology on the relationship between macro-level social and economic changes. Policy 
responses to these and experiences of crime and victimisation. Additionally, the approach we take 
ĞŵďĞĚƐƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐƌŝŵĞŝŶǁŝĚĞƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŽZŽĐŬ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ
that criminology is often chronocentric (2005). In order to fully explore the key processes under 
consideration, we draw upon literature from political science and especially that relating to historical 
institutionalism.    
 
4 
 
Historical Institutionalism: An Outline 
Historical Institutionalism is concerned with illuminating how institutions and institutional settings 
mediate the ways in which processes unfold over time (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). Peter Hall 
defines an institution as:  “ ? ? ?ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚoperating 
practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?&ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐof historical institutionalism is on the state, government 
institutions and social norms (Ikenberry, 1988: 222-223). Sanders, in keeping with the above, asserts 
ƚŚĂƚ “/Ĩ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶalism] teaches us anything, it is that the place to look for answers to big 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ QŝƐŝŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŶŽƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůŽŶŐĞƌůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŶŽƚƚŚĞ
ŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŶŽǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?Historical institutionalism, then, is an attempt to develop understanding 
of how political and policy processes and relationships play out over time coupled with an 
appreciation that prior events, procedures and processes will have consequences for subsequent 
events. ^ĂŶĚĞƌƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝon of historical institutionalism is that it is more 
enlightening to study human political interactions: a) in the context of rule structures that are 
themselves human creations; and b) sequential, as life is lived, rather than to take a snapshot of 
those interactions at only one point in time, and in isolation from the rule structures that 
 ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ )ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇŽĐĐƵƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?&Žƌ^ĂŶĚĞƌƐ ?then, historical institutionalists are mainly 
interested in how institutions are constructed, maintained and adapted over time (2006: 42). Since 
the initial flurry of activity establishing the theoretical and analytical and methodological 
distinctiveness of historical institutionalism (and which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s), 
some have criticised ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐĨŽƌĨŽĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ?ĚŝŵĞŶsions (Pierson, 2004: 8). In a series of highly-
stimulating publications, Pierson has pushed historical institutionalism towards a greater acceptance 
of not just the role of institutions in shaping society, but also that played by particular individuals 
and groups of individuals (Pierson, 1996, 2000, 2004). Thelen (1999: 375) argues that historical 
institutionalists ? approach is premised on the idea that institutions do more than just channel policy 
and structure political and policy conflict and formulation, rather they define the interests and 
create the objects of the policies themselves. As such, who articulates which interests, how and 
under which circumstances is a consequence not just of political desires and imperatives, but is itself 
a consequences of the sorts of institutions which are created and the contexts which they give rise 
to.  Time (and the taking of time seriously) is clearly a central variable in the work of historical 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ?ƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐƉƌŽƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? “ŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ QŽŶůǇƉůĂǇŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵ ? ?WŝĞƌƐŽŶ ? 2004: 41). Yet politicians 
are often only interested in the short term, creating the possibility of a series of unintended and 
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unplanned consequences which unfold and are realised only with the passage of time. Historical 
institutionalism is key for us due to its focus on politics and the longue duree. Let us now explore in a 
little more detail the building blocks of historical institutionalism.  
 
Key Concepts 
Before going on to exam both the main methodologies employed by historical institutionalists and 
how these ideas and methodologies can be employed and adapted in our own study of the long-
term impacts of Thatcherite social and economic policies on crime in the UK, an outline of the key 
concepts of historical institutionalism is required. We focus on seven of these, namely, path 
dependencies, positive feedback Loops, the timing and sequence of events and processes, the role 
of  ‘slow-ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ?ĐĂƵƐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚ ‘ƐůŽǁ-ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ?outcomes,  the relationship between historical 
institutionalism and the assumptions of theories of human agency (including rational choice), the 
role of critical junctures and the concept of punctuated equilibrium. Let us take each in turn.  
 
Path Dependencies 
Various definitions of this term exist. For Sewell (1996: 232-233) the terŵŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ǁŚĂƚ
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
ŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐĂƚĂůĂƚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŝŵĞ ? ?>ĞǀŝƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂƌĂƚŚĞƌůŽŶŐĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞƚŚorough) definition 
which is worth quoting at length:  
 “WĂƚŚĚependence has to mean ... that once a country has started down a track, the costs, of 
reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice, perhaps the better 
metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different 
branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from 
one to the other  W and essential if the chosen branch dies  W the branch on which a climber 
ďĞŐŝŶƐŝƐƚŚĞŽŶĞƐŚĞƚĞŶĚƐƚŽĨŽůůŽǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
This, indeed, is the definition used by Pierson (2004: 20), who adds that path dependence refers to a 
dynamic process which involves a positive feedback and which generates a series of further 
outcomes depending on the sequence in which these events and processes occur. (See also 
Stinchcombe, 1968: 103- ? ?ŽŶ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĐĂƵƐĞƐ ? ) ? As such, once a path has been selected and 
embarked upon, decisions, events and processes tend to reinforce this path, making the change to 
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an alternative path harder with each step. Over time the paths not taken become harder and harder 
to navigate back towards and the chosen path becomes more dominant. The order in which specific 
decisions are taken, and processes and events unfold will also shape the sorts of subsequent 
adaptions to the path taken. This approach has tended to make historical institutionalism rather 
conservative, in that it focuses on how paths are maintained, rather than changed  W an issue which 
we will have case to return to presently
1
.   
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐdŚĞůĞŶƌŝŐŚƚůǇŶŽƚĞƐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ? ?ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽǁĂŶƚĞĚĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉĂƚŚƚŽďĞ
adopted, or a different sets of institutions to be created or developed) in a path dependent system 
ĚŽŶŽƚƐŽŵĞŚŽǁ ‘ĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ ? (1999, see also Green, 1999: 23 on the liberal-market position within 
the Conservative Party during the period from 1945 to 1951). Those same actors and interest groups 
still exist (if in a less powerful or less influential state of being) and as such, can adapt their own 
stated policies or actual procedures to any emerging configuration of institutions. Such adaption(s) 
may mean waiting for more opportune moments to arise and/or assist in the reproduction of path 
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ?ŵŽve to either embrace or reject any emerging set of institutions. Even 
the rejection of a position in some ways provides it with legitimacy, since to reject is at some level to 
recognise it (even only temporarily). Naturally, as Bulmer cautions us, the idea of path dependency 
does not mean that all policy areas will be affected (or, by extension, affected at the same time or in 
the same ways, Bulmer 2009: 310). Similarly, whilst a particular historical moment may create a 
critical juncture (see below) for one institution, it does not mean that all institutions will be similarly 
effected (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 349). Even though an entire political system may face 
periods of widespread change, some institutions will remain surprisingly unaffected. Similarly, an 
unrecognised problem with the approach adopted by historical institutionalism is the consideration 
that a path dependency may become cumulatively destabilising over time. That is to say that 
continuing along a path may initially produce beneficial outcomes, but these may reach a critical 
threshold at which the benefits start to become outweighed by the negatives or lead to dramatic 
change (an analogy might be blowing air into a deflated balloon; this inflates the balloon, but 
continuing to inflate it will lead it to burst at some point). dŚĞĐůŽƐĞƚŽŶĞŐĞƚƐŝƐWŝĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
observation that pressures for change may build for sometime before leading to rapid change (2004: 
85). Nevertheless, such a discussion leads us on to another of the key concepts associated with 
historical institutionalism, namely that of positive feedback loops. 
                                                          
1
 In this respect, historical institutionalism has exhibited a similar problem to some theories of the middle 
ƌĂŶŐĞ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ'ŝĚĚĞŶƐ ?structuration theory, 1984) in that it tends to be able to explain reproduction of 
existing forms of institutions, but finds it harder to account for changes to institutions (see Johnson, 1990). 
Thelen (1999: 373) notes that historical institutionalism works  W in a theoretical sense - at the level of the 
middle range, although does not expand on the problems associated with working at this level of explanation. 
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Positive Feedback Loops  
Positive Feedback Loops are the phenomenon whereby each successive step along a particular path 
produces consequences which help to sustain the path in question. The example of the Polya Urn is 
often invoked to help outline the concept. Imagine a large urn which contain just two balls, one of 
which is red and the other black. One puts one hand into the urn and randomly picks one of the two 
balls (each of which has an equal probability of selection). Noting its colour, one then returns this 
ball and an identical ball of the same colour to the urn. Let us imagine that one picked the red ball on 
the first occasion a ball was selected, and hence returned two red balls to the urn. The urn now 
contains three balls, two of which are red and the other black. The chances of picking a black ball 
have now dropped to 1 in 3. Again, one selects a ball at random, again it is a red ball and again a 
further red ball is added to the urn. The urn now contains four balls, three of which are red and the 
fourth black. The probability of selecting a black ball has fallen further to 1 in 4. The experiment can 
be repeated endlessly, of course. Let us assume that one repeated this process, say, 100 times. What 
might the composition of the urn be? A number of key things can be said. First of all, no one has, at 
the outset of the selection process, any idea which ball will end up being dominant. It might be that 
had the black ball been drawn against the odds when it was one of three (and hence a further black 
ball placed in the urn) that when we got to the 50
th
 round, both balls were roughly equal. Or it might 
be that, over time, one ball became dominant. What can be said therefore is that, over time, a stable 
outcome will start to emerge (either the vast majority of the balls will be of one colour, or roughly 
equal proportions will emerge). Secondly, the sequence of balls drawn early on is hugely important 
in determining which (if any) colour will dominate. Imagine a situation in which 10 balls were in the 
urn, eight of which were red; the ball chosen is more likely to be red than black simply because there 
are six more red balls then black. On the other hand, if there were six more red balls than black ones 
but the numbers of each balls were 42 red and 34 black, it is much harder to be certain which colour 
ball will be chosen.  
 In this respect, as Pierson (2004: 45 notes),  “,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŝƐƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚ ? ?WŝĞƌƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?Thelen 
(1999: 392-96) provides an insightful discussion of the ways in which feedback loops operate. 
Summarising the work of Ikenberry (1994) she points to two mechanisms by which feedback occurs. 
The first is referred to by Ikenberry as functional, although as Thelen notes, it could also be 
described as providing incentive structures or initiating coordination effects (1999: 392). The basic 
premise is that, once a set of institutions are in place, social actors and other institutions adapt their 
repertoire of activities in ways which reflect (and hence reinforce) the logic of the system (even if 
ƐƵĐŚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĚŽŶŽƚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌƌŝďůǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŽƌ ‘ůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ǁĂǇƐ ) ?One example which Thelen cites 
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to illustrate this mode of feedback loop concerns those welfare systems identified by Epsing-
Anderson (1990) as being conservative-corporativist, and which are based on the notion of a single 
(typically therefore, male) family breadwinner and which encourages low levels of engagement in 
the labour market of female members of society. The second feedback mechanism identified by 
Ikenberry relates to the distributional effects of institutions. The central premise behind this idea is 
ƚŚĂƚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?ďƵƚĂƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚŽƌĞǀŽůǀĞƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐt and 
reproduce certain forms of power distribution in society. It is via this mechanism that some sections 
of society find that power and influence accumulates to them, whilst others find that their stocks of 
these resources are diminished over time. As one group accumulates power and influence, so it is 
able to influence institutions in such a way as to reproduce power inequalities and accumulate still 
more power.     
 
Timing and Sequence 
ƐWŝĞƌƐŽŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “Ɛequence matters because there are irreversibilŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ). That is to say 
that in some instances one cannot ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ ‘undo ?ĞĂƌůŝĞƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ. 
Similarly,  “wŚĞŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĞǀĞŶƚŽƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĐĐƵƌƐŝŶĂƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞǁŝůůŵĂŬĞĂďŝŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?
(Pierson, 2004: 64). Pierson outlines three ways of treating sequencing and feedback loops (2004: 
64-65). The first of these is to approach them as self-reinforcing processes (where by a set of 
relationships becomes increasingly embedded over time). The second is to explore how earlier 
events trigger feedbacks (for example whereby particular arrangements established at a critical 
juncture become consolidated). The last of these is to develop a focus on long-term effects (for 
example whereby A causes B, B causes C and so on), (see Pierson 2004: 65-68). A further 
consideration is what is known as event sequences (Pierson 2004: 68), which are instances in which 
an outcome is determined not simply by what happened, but by the order in which these events 
took place. Whilst some changes may emerge quite quickly, some changes, for example those 
involving social capabilities may be very slow (Pierson 2004: 75) since such changes may involve 
inter-generational replacement or over time shifting a sufficient proportion of a ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
attitudes in a particular direction. All of these are the sorts of processes which we may need to be 
conscious of for our project.  
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 ‘^ůŽǁ-ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ?causal processes and outcomes 
One things which unites almost all branches of the social sciences is the search for causality. 
Historical institutionalists are, in this at least, no different from other social scientists. However, the 
approach adopted (due to the emphasis on taking time seriously) radically alters the time-frames 
which analysts influenced by this body of work are prepared to consider. In sum, the position of 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐĐĂŶďĞĞŶĐĂƉƐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ “ĞǀĞŶƚƐŽĨĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚĐĂƵƐĂů
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚĂůǁĂǇƐƚĂŬĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŝŵĞƚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶ ? ?ďďŽƚƚ ? ? ? ? ?: 174 quoted 
in Pierson 2004: 82). As Pierson additionally notes,  “the fact that something happens slowly does not 
ŵĂŬĞŝƚƵŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?This perspectives acts as a corrective to those accounts of change 
(or stability) which focus upon the immediate causes of things. Pierson outlines how four differing 
time horizons for exploring and explaining causal processes can be identified by sampling thinking in 
terms of fast and slow causes and outcomes (Pierson 2004: 81). These four he suggests are: 
1) Short-term causes with immediate outcomes (e.g. a tornado) 
2) Short-term causes with long-term outcomes (e.g. a meteorite which causes mass 
extinction) 
3) Long-term causes with immediate outcomes (e.g. an earthquake) 
4) Long-term causes with long-term outcomes (e.g. global warming).  
Which of these an analyst wishes to invoke will partly be a consequence of how the relevant 
research questions are framed. Of course, the illustrations which Pierson chooses are not quite as 
distinct as he may wish them to be. For example, meteorites do not appear out of nowhere, they are 
part of a much larger (and longer) sequence of events, similarly an earthquake is often the result of a 
build-up of pressure which has accumulated over several years, decades or millennia (and may of 
course have consequences which endure for several years or decades). But these points need not 
detract us from the fact that this schema is nevertheless an extremely valuable one. Of central 
interest in our research (since we are primarily concerned with historical causal processes and the 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐĞƚŽĨƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ůĞŐĂĐǇ ? )ŝƐƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
a) slow-moving causal processes and b) slow-moving consequences. Let us take each in turn.  
A process may be slow-moving in a causal sense because these causes may be cumulative, whereby 
an outcome is caused by a continuous but extremely gradual process. An example of this form of 
slow-moving causal process might include a slow attitudinal shift amongst a section of society (or 
perhaps a whole society) which may take several decades to emerge (indeed, Figure 3 below 
provides an example of one such form of change). As Pierson notes (2004: 82) changes of this nature 
10 
 
are most likely to be identified by and of most interest to sociologists (and especially those 
interested in period and/or cohort effects). Slowly rising support for, for example, female 
emancipation is the sort of processes which spring to mind. Feminists arguing for women to be given 
the right to vote (for example) needed to embark on a prolonged fight in order to them to win (often 
incrementally) suffrage. Another form of slow-moving causal process may involve threshold effects. 
In this form of causal process incremental change does not, per se, lead to any tangible outcome. 
However, when a particular threshold is reached it then triggers a change. (The idea is similar to that 
ŽĨƚŚĞƚŝƉƉŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚŽƌ ‘ƚĂŬĞŽĨĨ ?ƉŽŝŶƚ ) ?An example of these sorts of processes may be the impact of 
demographic changes and subtly changing aspirations of a younger generation of voters or the 
politically-engaged and which leads to an uprising, either delivered via the ballot box or via direct 
action against the ruling (and generationally older) political class
2
. The key is that the pressure for 
change will accumulate over some period of time without generating any outward signs of 
impending change (until the threshold is reached). Finally, slow-moving causal processes maybe 
produced by long-term causal influences. It is common, of course, to think of short causal chains, 
such as A causes B. But in some cases it may be the case that A causes B, which causes C, which 
causes D (and so on). Given that few of these causal chains will produce immediate outcomes (since 
some may themselves be based on threshold effects or cumulative causes) then the causal chain 
may well be an extremely long one (in terms of the elapsed time). Of course, such effects are also 
likely to be indirect, since causal process A may relate to the economy, causal process B to social 
values, causal process C to political participation and causal process D to outcomes in the make-up 
of governing institutions such as parliaments (for example). In identifying and articulating such 
causal processes one nĞĞĚƐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ‘ƚŝŐŚƚůǇĐŽƵƉůĞĚ ? ?WŝĞƌƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
longer the causal chain and/or the temporal processes involved the harder this will be. Of course, a 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉƌŽďůĞŵǁŝůůĞŵĞƌŐĞŝŶĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ‘ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĨŽƌ the causal chain (since 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐďĞƐŽŵĞƉƌŝŽƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ůĞĚ ? W at least in theory  W ƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶŝƚŝĂů ?ĐĂƵƐĂů
process identified by the analyst). Pierson offers three rules of thumb with regards to the left-hand 
censoring: break the chain at key critical junctures (see our discussions above and below); break the 
chain when it becomes hard to establish the prior causal connections; or break the chain according 
to either the substantive or theoretical interests of the analyst.  
 ‘^ůŽǁ-ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ?outcomes are those outcomes which have long time horizons, that is, where 
detectable and meaningful change in the outcome in question emerges slowly (Pierson 2004: 90-92). 
Examples of such slow-moving outcomes (as cited by Pierson, 2004: 90-92) include situations in 
which a group of people are replaced over time (such as at a societal level when new generations 
                                                          
2
 ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞƚŚĞ ‘ƌĂď^ƉƌŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? 
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replace older ones, or in an elected body where a certain number of elected officials may leave 
office at the end of a term of administration). Alternatively it might be that the outcome being 
shaped lays some way off in the future. This may be the case with reforms to pension schemes, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽŶĞǁŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ƚĞƌŵƐŵĂǇŶŽƚƌĞĂƉĂŶǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
retirement since it may be 40 or so years before those contributing under the changed scheme will 
retire.  
 
Rational Choice and Agency 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992) argue that historical institutionalism grew out of a critique of rational 
choice models (which rose to prominence in US sociology during the 1980s) and their neglect of 
institutional contexts (see also Mouzelis, 2008: 20). Accordingly, several of the key proponents in 
this field are critical of rational choice theorising (for example, Thelen and Steinmo argue that 
ratŝŽŶĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĂƌĞ “ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐǁŝƐŚƚŽ “ŐŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂŶĚ
ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƉůĂǇĂŵƵĐŚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƌŽůĞŝŶƐŚĂƉŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
Thelen notes that historical insitutionalists and rational choice theorists start from different places 
(1999: 379). Rational choice theorists start with a focus on individuals and ask where institutions 
 ‘ĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵ ? ?ǁŚŝůƐƚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŝŶĐůŝ ĞĚƚŽƐƚĂƌƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂƐŬŚŽǁ
tŚĞƐĞĂůƚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞƌĞƚĂŝŶƐĂŶŝƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
Pierson is probably the author who goes furthest in articulating the full range of limitations of 
rational choice models (2004: 108-122). In all, Pierson cites six limitations with rational choice 
models: 
1) Institutions have multiple effects (and motivations). Because institutions are made up of 
various (at times competing groups, at times collaborating groups) there are both 
multiple motivations for adopting particular courses of action, and, naturally, multiple 
outcomes of many courses of action and processes. In some instances, as Pieron notes, 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐďĞĐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂƐ ‘common carriers ? for coalitions of reformers 
who may support a particular innovation for a multitude of reasons (2004: 109). As such 
rational choice models are inadequate explanations of the causes of institutional 
processes since no one individual can control the entire process.    
2) Even if this were not the case, actors may not always act in either their long-term 
interests or the most effective ways (Pierson, 2004: 110). People may be motivated by 
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĨĞĞůƚŽďĞ ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĨĞĞůƚŽďĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?dŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
12 
 
this observation Pierson quotes Hall and Taylor (1996: 946-947) who write that 
 “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĂĚŽƉƚĞĚƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚŚĞ
most efficient for the tasks at hand ... instead they ... should be seen as culturally-
specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and 
ĂƐƐŝŵŝůĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĂĐƚŽƌƐŵĂǇŶŽƚ ůǁĂǇƐďĞƉƵƌĞůǇƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ďƵƚ
may be guided by wider social and cultural norms.   
3) As argued above, the outcomes of some processes can be viewed as long-term. Does 
this mean that actors adopt such long-term perspectives in their thinking? It may not do 
so, in fact there are many instances in which politicians and policy makers are 
encouraged to focus more on short-term outcomes than on long-term ones. As such, the 
long-term outcomes of insititutional processes may be the result of actions taken with 
only (or predominantly) short-term goals in mind. In this way, many actors, who often 
will have short time horizons, end up ignoring the long-term outcomes of the processes 
or policies which they pursue (Pierson, 2004: 112). However, many of the outcomes of 
changes in institutional procedures will play out over the long-term. Rational choice 
models which centre on the actor(s) may inadvertently look past the long-term 
outcomes of short-term decision making. Of course, this does not mean that historical 
institutionalists only believe that actors have short-term perspectives; but rather it is to 
acknowledge that they commonly do have short-term perspectives.  
4) A further criticism of rational choice models is that some outcomes will (inevitably) be 
unintended by those designing the policies or procedures under consideration. As such, 
the outcomes may include many which were not intended (or perhaps, even recognised) 
by those who initiated them. Or, to add even more complexity, some courses of action 
may have been pursued by coalitions of interest, some of the members of which may 
have been aware of the unintended consequences and others unaware. As societies and 
the institutions which they develop become more complex, such unintended 
consequences may be a) harder to spot before they start to emerge and b) more 
widespread in occurrence and effect.  
5) In addition to the above, Pierson (2004: 119-120) notes that even after an institutional 
arrangement has been selected, over time, and with wider environmental change (i.e. in 
terms of the political culture, social processes, demography and so on) gaps between 
what some actors want and what some institutions can deliver will emerge. This may 
prompt political elites to try to change the political institutional forms in order to 
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produce new outcomes or to avoid possible future outcomes. As such, it is hard to 
ascertain exactly which institutional arrangement is the most efficient.    
6) Similarly, not all actors will remain active in a particular institutional form (some will 
retire from office, die or move on to other roles), and hence rational choice assumptions 
of actor continuity may be unfounded (Pierson, 2004: 120). However, the problems of 
actor discontinuity are far less pressing for historical insitutionalists, who would expect 
that key actors will change over time and that the actors who inherit a set of 
institutional arrangements may not be those who designed them.  
Hay and Wincott (1998: 951), ŝŶĐƌŝƚŝƋƵŝŶŐ,ĂůůĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ), ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ “ ? ? ?ŝĨ
institutionalism is to develop to its full potential, it must consider the relationship between structure 
ĂŶĚĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶǁĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŝŶƚŽŽƵƌƚŚŝŶŬŝng along the ways in which Hay and 
Wincott originally expressed them (1998: 956-7), i.e. that groups and individuals are knowledgeable 
(although the limits of their knowledge may be constrained in various ways and to various degrees) 
and are reflexive (in that they often monitor the consequences of their endeavours partly to assess 
the extent to which these produced the desired outcomes and partly in order to learn more about 
how to effect similar sorts of outcomes again). In these ways groups and individuals assess both the 
immediate outcomes of their actions and the longer term outcomes (and, it can be reasonably 
assumed, monitor the outcomes of the actions of others too). This provides them with insights about 
both how and how well the intended outcomes were produced via their actions and the extent to 
which these were opposed, distorted or adapted by opponents (for example). Such analyses (on the 
part of individuals and groups) yields two key processes (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 956): 
 “ ? ? )direct effects upon the institutional and institutionalised contexts within which it takes 
place and within which future action occurs  W producing a partial transformation of that 
institutional environment (though not necessarily as anticipated) and altering the course of 
its temporal unfolding (however marginally); 
(2) strategic learning on the part of the actors involved  W as they revise their perceptions of 
what is feasible, possible and indeed desirable in the light of their assessments of their own 
ability to realise prŝŽƌŐŽĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ) ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƐƐŝŵŝůĂƚĞŶĞǁ ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĨƌŽŵ
whatever external source), and as they reorient future strategies in the light of such 
 ‘ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ?ĂŶĚŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚĂƐĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚƚĞƌƌĂŝŶŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ
and cŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ? ? 
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/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŬĞĞƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨWŝĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŽǁŶǁŽƌŬ ?ǁĞĂŝŵƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶďŽƚŚĂĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
institutions and how these develop over time, but also acknowledge and develop the idea that key 
actors and groups of actors can shape (sometimes quite considerably) the courses of action taken 
and the sorts of outcomes both desired for and achieved. In keeping with this, Pierson himself 
prefers to refer to institutional development (rather than change), since ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘development ? ?ŚĞ
argues, ŬĞĞƉƐƵƐĂƚƚƵŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƉƌŝŽƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ‘ƐƚĂǇ
ǁŝƚŚƵƐ ? ?WŝĞƌƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
 
Critical junctures and the concept of punctuated equilibrium 
WŝĞƌƐŽŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůũƵŶĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂƐŵŽŵĞŶƚƐǁŚĞŶ institutional arrangements are placed on 
particular pathways which are difficult to subsequently alter or change. For Capoccia and Kelemen 
(2007: 341) such moments are rare and represent  “ďƌŝĞĨƉŚĂƐĞƐŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĨůƵǆ QĚƵƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚ
more dramatic change iƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? (and presumably signals the end of other institutions). They add 
that critical junctures are often the starting points for path dependent processes. Such moments are 
considered to be relatively short periods of time (2007: 348) and that during these episodes there is 
an increased chance that agents will be able to affect significant change. In this way agents are freer 
than during periods of equilibrium to act in ways which may initiate new policies or procedures. 
Sometimes critical junctures may emerge slowly, being produced over time by the accumulation of 
related events (2007: 350). Of course, if a number of outcomes are possible from a critical juncture, 
ŝƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŵĂǇďĞƚŚĞƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽĂŶĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ‘ƉƌĞ-ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞnts (2007: 352). 
Wuthnow (1989) shows how new schools of thought, once they reach a critical mass, are able to 
extend their reach by the generation of institutions and organisations which reproduce their 
ideological position (Pierson 2004: 39). Thelen, rather critically, notes that many authors do not 
articulate sufficiently how the outcomes of critical junctures become translated into lasting legacies 
(1999: 390). Such theorising has obvious similarities with another branch of political science, name 
the theory of punctuated equilibrium (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 15).  
Although not formally an element of the work on historical institutionalism, both Thelen and 
Steinmo (1992) and Zehavi (2012) argue that work on punctuated equilibrium could, at least in 
theory, operate alongside historical instituionalism (see also Bulmer, 2009: 308). The theory of 
punctuated equilibrium in public policy suggests that long-run stability in policy-making is subject to 
occasional seismic shifts when existing institutions and issue definitions break down and pressure for 
change accumulates to the point where is cannot be ignored (Krasner, 1984 and Baumgartner and 
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Jones, 2009). ƐĞŚĂǀŝĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŝƚ ? “ĂƚƐŽŵĞƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇŽĨ ?ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇ
[is] sufficient enough to merit media and public attention, and policy makers, due to public criticism, 
would react  W perhaps even overreact  W with a major reform that would shift the policy point of 
ĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞwidespread recognition, over time, that some policy or 
approach is  ‘ĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĐŚĂŶŐĞŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚďƌŝŶŐƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ?ĂŶĚ
starts the processes by which a new equilibrium is reached.  /Ŷ<ƌĂƐŶĞƌ ?ƐŵŽĚĞůƚŚĞŝŵƉĞƚƵƐĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ
change is external (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 15). Hence punctuated equilibrium  W a moment or 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚĚƵƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵŝƐ ‘ƉƵŶĐƚƵƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂŶĞǁŽŶĞŝƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
emerge.  
  
Constructivist Institutionalism: Recognising that Ideas Shape Pathways 
More recently ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌďŽĚǇŽĨ ‘ŝŶƐtŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŚĂƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ out of a dialogue with 
historical institutionalism ?ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇ,Ăůů ?ƐŵŽƌĞŝĚĞĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞinstitutionalist approach 
(very much manifest in his work on Keynesianism as an economic paradigm institutionalised 
differently in Britain and France and his influential work on paradigm shifts, see Hall, 1992). Going 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ƚŚŝƐĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ŝŶĞssence, that historical 
institutionalism overlooks the role which ideas play in shaping political outcomes (Ross, 2011, Hay, 
2011). The basic observations of constructivist institutionalism (as summarised by Bell, 2011) is that 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝƐƚŽŽ ‘ƐƚŝĐŬǇ ? ?Ğůů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? )ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚĞĂƐŝůǇĂůůŽǁĨŽƌindividual 
agency (a point, it ought to be noted he argues against, having noted that constructivist 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŵĂǇ ?ŝŶƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐŝŶŐĂŐĞŶĐǇ ?ŝŶĂĚǀĞƌƚĞŶƚůǇ ‘ƚĂŬĞŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? P
884).  
This form of institutionalism focuses on the ways in which ideas, rather than solely agents, can 
change or mould institutions and processes. In short ideas can also influence such processes. 
WŝĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂƌĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇŚĂƌĚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?
(2000: 490) ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ “ĂĐƚŽƌƐĨŝŶĚthe dead weight of previous institutional choices seriously limits 
ƚŚĞŝƌƌŽŽŵƚŽŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? )ĂƌĞƚĂŬĞŶas suggesting that agency is seriously hampered. 
Indeed, and as Hay notes, within the auspices of historical institutionalism, change is seen as the 
outcome of path dependent processes or from shocks from outwith (Hay 2011: 66). This overlooks 
what Hay refers to as  ‘ƉĂƚŚ-ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ?(as opposed to path-dependent) possibilities (Hay, 2011: 66). 
,ĂǇ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨmuch current historical institutionalism stresses that whilst it continues to focus on 
path dependencies, it will remain unable to fully account for institutional changes. In short, historical 
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institutionalism can account for the genesis of institutional forms, but is unable to copy easily with 
radical  change in institutional forms or processes (Hay 2011). Constructivist institutionalism, as Hay 
portrays it, is less concerned than historical or rational choice institutionalism with the  ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ?
uses of institutions for dealing with uncertainty (Hay 2011: 68), instead viewing institutions as the 
focus and subject of political struggles. By bringing a focus on ideas into play, constructivist 
institutionalism forces us to grapple with the concept of ideational path-dependence (as well as 
institutional path-dependence, Hay 2011: 68-69). ƐůǇƚŚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ? “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞŽŶůǇŵĂŬĞƐ
ƐĞŶƐĞďǇƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƐƚŚĂƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽŵŽŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂŶĚ
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?Through these lenses, ideas become codified and start to serve as the cognitive 
filters through which actors are able to conceive of their interests (Hay 2011: 69), and presumably 
ĂůƐŽƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĂŶǇƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƌŽŽŵĨŽƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůŝŬĞůǇŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐŽĨĂŶǇ
course of action. ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ůǇƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ŝĚĞĂƐŐŝǀĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂŶĚ
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨŶĞǁŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?As such, constructivist institutionalism allows 
one to develop explanations which include novel developments, and counterbalances historical 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůinertia (Hay 2011: 69). In this way, and akin to 
theories of the middle range in sociology (see, for example, Giddens, 1984, Bourdieu, 1977, Mouzelis, 
2008), actors are viewed as being active (Hay 2011: 71) in that they make decisions, have interests, 
goals and aims. However, and as Hay notes,  “dŚĞŵŽƌĞŝĚĞĂƐŵĞĚŝĂƚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ
ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐďĞĐŽŵĞ ?(2011: 73), implying that simply recognising that 
ĂĐƚŽƌƐŚĂǀĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ŝƐan insufficient step. Actors also have ideas and develop and draw up 
meanings in line with such ideas and values; as such what is desired and why it is so desired is as 
much about how it is thought of and conceptualised as it is about the simple achievement of an 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?ŽŶĞŵŝŐŚƚĂƌŐƵĞ ?ĂƐ,ĂǇĚŽĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝnterests do not really exist. Rather social 
and political constructions of interests ĂƌĞǁŚĂƚ ‘ĞǆŝƐƚƐ ? (Hay 2011: 79) and it is these constructions 
which motivate political actors. Extending this, if an idea supports the construction of a set of 
interests which motivates actors towards finding ways of shaping institutional arrangements such 
that path trajectories are altered, then those actors positioned to exert influence on such 
arrangements will seek institutional change.  
 
Methodological Concerns 
Given the need to explain in detail the processes involved in how policies are constructed and the 
role of various institutions in these, numerous research methods have been developed in order to 
explore the subject matter at hand. Of course, historical institutionalists have developed their 
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methodological approaches over time. The first wave of historical institutionalism focused on those 
holders of power who shaped and steered political processes, and tended, in general, to ignore 
 ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?ǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚƐŽĨŐǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐƵďũĞĐƚƐǁŚŽƐĞŝĚĞĂƐ
and demands might have shaped institutional develop and provoked institutional change, Sanders, 
2006: 45). And of course, and like all fields of study, but perhaps at greater risk of falling into this 
trap, historical institutionalists need to make sure that the analyses of the processes they are 
interested in do not become merely descriptions of what happened rather than explanations for why 
it happened (Pierson, 2004: 49). Nevertheless, at least some element of description is required; as 
Sanders notes,  “ QŵŽƐƚ[historical insitutionalist] analysis is founded on dense, empirical description 
ĂŶĚŝŶĚƵĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?Accordingly, and as she goes on to note  “ QŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞ
construction, maintenance, and outcomes of institutions draws [historical institutionalism] towards 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? ? ?06: 43). And, naturally, the choice of substantive focus  “ ? ? ?has 
methodological implications, because at the top there are few actors and one is likely to proceed by 
analysing documents, decisions, speeches, memoirs and press reports of actions/ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? ?a^nders 
2006: 43). For these reasons, historical institutionalism ŝƐ “ƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůǇ ?ĂŵĞƐƐŝůǇĞĐůĞĐƚŝĐŐĞŶƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ
the lack of agreement on foci and approaches does distinguish [historical institutionalism] from 
rational choice and conventional, cross-sectionaůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ?^ĂŶĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?Similarly, 
and as Sanders notes,  “ QƚŚĞŵĂƌƐŚĂůůŝŶŐŽĨƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽŵĂŬĞŽŶĞ ?ƐĐĂƐĞǁŝůů
inevitably limit the time period covered, and the fullest understanding of policy paths and policy 
change can probably be gained by studies that concentrate on single-ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ Q ?
(Sanders, 2006: 52). Nevertheless, several studies of limited comparisons of countries undergoing 
similar processes of change do exist (e.g. Pierson, 1996, King, 1992) 
Pierson helpfully touches on methodological matters towards the end of his book (2004: 169-175). 
dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƚĞŵƉŽƌĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ
the processes at hand (2004: 169), and naturally that is something we have endeavoured to do with 
our project (and Pierson gives a cautious nod towards time series modelling itself, 2004: 170, 
although notes that analysts must be alert to changes in the relationships between variables 
themselves, so not only might there be a relationship between, say, unemployment and the 
economy, but it might strengthen or weaken over time). As he notes, such analyses retain an 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶ ‘ƚŚĞǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵĐŚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞůŽŶŐŝƚƵĚŝŶĂůĚĂƚĂƐĞƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂůůŽǁĂŶĂůǇƐƚƐƚŽ
explore the temporal sequencing of events and processes (2004: 173).Pierson also suggests that 
theories need to be well integrated and matched with the methodologies employed, such that the 
latter allows for a full exploration of the issue at hand. So, if a theory suggests that a policy adopted 
at T1 will create reinforcing feedback loops (such as changes in political organisation, the political 
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agenda, voting preferences and so on) then we ought to expect not only just the reinforcement of 
the policy a T+1, but also changes in the attendant political organisations, agendas and voting 
preferences in line with the policy). Capoccia and Kelemen (2007: 355) suggest that analysts ask 
 ‘ǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨǁŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƵƐe of process 
tracing, systematic process analyses and narratives of analysis.  
 
Applying this to Thatcherism 
In a number of publications we have sketched an outline of how one might approach a 
conceptualisation and subsequent analysis of the long-term impacts of Thatcherite social and 
economic policies. In Hay and Farrall (2011), for example, we identified ThatchĞƌŝƐŵĂƐĂ “ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů
path-ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞĚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƚŚĂƚǁĞƐĂǁdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌŝƐŵĂƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŶŽƚ
just at the policy-level, but also at the ideational level. In this section we explore how some of the 
ideas outlined above may be incorporated more formally into our approach. In the remainder of this 
essay we wish to focus principally on two issues. The first of these is the importance of ideas to a full 
appreciation of the changes initiated by the Thatcher governments. The second is an attempt to 
chart the ways in which some of the policies which were enacted during this period altered 
behaviours of the population, and also the ways in which the population reacted to these in turn 
altered the approach adopted by politicians and policy-makers. We will also touch on out thinking 
with regards to the levels (and speeds) of explanation. So, whilst politics makes policies, and policies 
make politics (a quote frequently attributed to Theda Skocpol), so policies shape behaviours and 
behaviours shape policy responses and political ideas. Let us start with the ideational foundations of 
the Thatcher administrations.  
 
dŚĞ/ĚĞĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƐŝƐŽĨdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ P ‘/ĨĂƚĨŝƌƐƚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƐƵĐĐĞĞĚ ? ? 
Thelen notes how  “Institutions rest on a set of ideational and material foundations that, if shaken, 
ŽƉĞŶƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?(1999: 397). It is not hard to see how the period in the run up to the 
election of the first Thatcher government (in 1979) was one in which a new set of ideas about how 
best to deal with the mounting crises which the UK faced were starting to emerge (Hay 2011: 67). In 
this respect, this period represents a critical juncture. Alfred Sherman  ?ŽŶĞŽĨdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂů
advisors) ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ<ĞŝƚŚ:ŽƐĞƉŚ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĞƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?-1970 started to articuůĂƚĞ^ŚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŽǁŶ
views that market forces needed to be taken into account more readily (Sherman, 2005: 45). Hall 
 ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ŶŽƚĞƐŚŽǁdĞĚ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ?-1974) started to take steps towards the sorts 
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of policies later pursued by Thatcher (as does Caincross, 1996: 124), but retreated from these after 
the rises in unemployment and inflation in 1971-72
3
. ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐƉůĂŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞŵŝŶĚ-set 
ŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂƚĂƐƚĞŽĨdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?ĂůĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dĂǇůŽƌ ? ? ? ? ?Ă P ?41. As 
Green notes (1999: 34) some of the ideas which emerged from the Selsdon Park conference in early 
1970 also invigorated the liberal-market wing of the Conservative Party. In this respect Heath can be 
ƐĞĞŶĂƐĂ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐs (Taylor, 1996b: 189). After the election of a Labour 
government (in 1974) the economic policies pursued were still Keynesian, but following 1976 and 
ĂůůĂŐŚĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐŽĨtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŽŽŬĂŵŽŶĞƚĂƌŝƐƚƚƵƌŶ ?,Ăůů ? ? ? ? ? P
93; ƐĞĞZĂŶĞůĂŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂůůĂŐŚŶ ŶĚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ,Ăůů
 ? ? ? ? P ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ,ĞĂƚŚ ?ƐĂŶĚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ) ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚďǇĂĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐ
increase in inflation in 1975 and the stagnation of the UK economy coupled with high levels of 
unemployment, which drove policy makers to search for new ideas in the early 1970s
4
. These ideas 
were to fail to gain traction immediately, however. This was partly due to Callaghan and Healy ?Ɛ
uncertainly about taking monetarist ideas forward in 1976-1978 and, in part, due to the simple fact 
that radical ideas take time to gain popularity and hence become the basis for action. As Hall (1992: 
99) notes, Keynesianism was so firmly embedded in thinking at the Treasury that the stagnation of 
the mid- ? ? ? ?ƐǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƌĞĐĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚƚŽǁŝƚŚŝŶ<ĞǇŶĞƐŝĂŶĂ
framework. People with new ideas to promote need time to create institutional structures around 
them in order to cement the appeal of their ideas to wider audiences. /ŶƉĂƌƚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐǁĂƐ
due to the efforts made in the direction of promoting monetarism by both the Callaghan and Heath 
governments (who initiated such policies). By the time which Thatcher took office the ideas were 
better developed and there was wider support for them amongst the City, Universities and the 
media. When her policies encountered difficulties, Thatcher was able to draw on these institutions 
and the wider, more established monetarist framework in order press on with them. There was also 
a sense that a change of direction was needed. In part too Thatcher ǁĂƐŬĞĞŶŶŽƚƚŽƌĞƉĞĂƚ,ĞĂƚŚ ?Ɛ
U-turn (Thatcher, 1993: 13-14). In short, monetarism before 1979 was an idea whose time had not 
yet come (Cairncross, 1996: 125, a sentiment echoed by Taylor, 1996a: 147-157).  
In addition to this, and unlike the Labour government of 1974- ? ? ? ? ?dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
had a good working majority in the House of Commons (44 MPs to compared ĂůůĂŐŚĂŶ ?Ɛminority 
government from September 1978 when the Lib-Lab pact came to an end). In addition, because of 
                                                          
3
 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?,ĞĂƚŚƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ĚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌůĂƚĞƌƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?,
Cairncross, 1996: 138.  
4
 And, of course, away from the Phillips Curve. The Phillips Curve described the inverse relationship between 
unemployment and inflation (such that when unemployment is high inflation is low, and vice versa). The 
validity of the Phillips Curve diminished after the 1970s, when several prominent economies experienced both 
high levels of unemployment and high levels of inflation. 
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>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĐůŽƐĞůŝŶŬƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞdƌĂĚĞhŶŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂůůĂŐŚĂŶĨŽƵŶĚŝƚŚĂƌĚƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞ
the public sector wage bill (Hall, 1992: 99). For these reasons the initial forays into monetarism by 
the Labour government in 1976-77 were piecemeal and driven by a concern to move away from 
Keynesianism rather than a more positive move towards monetarism. Some of these changes were 
due, as Green (1999: 39-40) notes, to an intergenerational shift in the ranks of Tory MPs, who 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇǁĞƌĞĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĂůĂƌŝĞĚ ?ŵŝĚĚůĞĐůĂƐƐĂŶĚůĞƐƐĂŶĚůĞƐƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ŬŶŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ƐŚŝƌĞƐ ? ? 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĨŽƌĂĨƵůůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚǇŵŽŶĞƚĂƌŝƐŵǁĂƐĂĚŽƉƚĞĚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
victory in 1979 one needs to weave into this account the demands of the International Monetary 
Fund in 1976 and other, more subtle factors. Some of the economic decisions taken in 1976-77 were 
forced upon the government by the financial markets, whilst similarly rank and file union members 
started to become disillusioned with their leadership (Hall, 1992: 100, Bogdanor, 1996: 378), 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘tŝŶƚĞƌŽĨŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?. The financial markets had been strengthened by 
Heath in 1971 and ultimately resulted in increasing numbers of economists being hired to monitor 
government economic policy, which in turn resulted in an increase in circulars being published for 
the clients of brokerage houses (Hall, 1992: 102). These developments increased the speed and 
cohesiveness with which the City responded to government policy  W meaning that governments 
were forced into increasing interest rates on gilts in or to raise capital. They also meant that the 
money supply became a concern within the City. 
In addition to these factors, Young (1991:102-103) notes how it was that during the mid-1970s Keith 
Joseph started to articulate ideas about inflation, levels of taxation, unemployment, the money 
supply, trade unions and the limits of what the government could (and ought to) do (John Hoskyns  W 
another early advisor to Thatcher - notes that Joseph was keen on the notion of political innovation, 
2000: 26). Such topics became the bedrock of what was later known as Thatcherism and were being 
introduced and promoted by Sherman at the Centre for Policy Studies (Hoskyns, 2000: xii). Ranelagh 
ŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŵŽŶĞƚĂƌŝƐƚŝĚĞĂƐƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽĞŵďĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞ
in the mid-1970s, and started to be aired during PMQs and during television interviews with 
Thatcher (1991: 176). Many of these ideas came from outwith the Conservative Party, such as 
,ŽƐŬǇŶ ?Ɛ ‘ǁŝƌŝŶŐĚŝĂŐƌĂŵƐ ?ŽĨŚŽǁĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?ƐĞĞ,ŽƐŬǇŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? P
18 and 405). /Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇĂĨƚĞƌdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƐƉĂƌƚǇůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŽŶƐĞrvative 
Philosophy Group was formed, and provided a forum in which ideas developed in academia could be 
discussed with the party leader (Ranelagh, 1991: 187). Similarly the Centre for Policy Studies played 
a key role in facilitating the exchange of ideas between academics and policy makers (Ranelagh, 
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1991: 214). Ɛ,ƵŐŚdŚŽŵĂƐŶŽƚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? “ŶĞǁŝĚĞĂƐŚĂǀĞĂŵƵĐŚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐŚĞĂƌĚ ?
amongst the conservatives than they had done previously (cited in Ranelagh, 1991: 169)
5
. Even so, 
there was still ŵƵĐŚ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŽĨŝĚĞĂƐƚŽďĞĚŽŶĞ ?,ŽƐŬǇŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
dŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚŽŶĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ĂŶŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐŚŽǁ,ĞĂƚŚŚĂĚŶŽƚ
enjoyed the backing of such a revolution in the way Thatcher had (Blake, 1985 cited in Young, 
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?^ƵĐŚŝĚĞĂƐƋƵŝĐŬůǇďĞĐĂŵĞĐŽŶĚĞŶƐĞĚŝŶƚŽƌĂƚŚĞƌ ŵŽƌĞĞĂƐŝůǇĚŝŐĞƐƚŝďůĞ ‘ƐŽƵŶĚďŝƚĞƐ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƉĂĐŬĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĞǀŽůǀĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚĂǆĐƵƚƐ ? ‘ŐŽŽĚŚŽƵƐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĞ
control of public spending, individual freedom, national revival and  ‘ƐĞůĨƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞ ? ?see Ranelagh, 
1991: 34, Young, 1991: 147). Over time, ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĨƌĞĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ?ZĂŶĞůĂŐŚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )
ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽĞŵĞƌŐĞĂŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨ ‘dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌŝƐŵ ? ?In this respect 
there was what Hall (1992: 104) has described as a market place of economic ideas. This 
development went hand-in-hand with the rise and proliferation of independent think tanks, which in 
turn lead to a rise in newspaper coverage of such ideas (Sherman also started writing for The 
Telegraph, Young, 1991: 113).  
As such we view the advent, emergence and political dominance of the set of ideas now known as 
 ‘dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌŝƐŵ ?ƚŽďĞďĞƐƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐĞƚĐŚĞĚĂďŽǀĞƵƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐĨƌŽŵ
both historical and constructivist institutionalisms. Thatcherism did not appear out of nowhere, but 
was a response to a series of largely (but not exclusively) economic problems with emerged in the 
early 1970s. Scepticism with the post-war consensus had never left the Tories, but had been 
suppressed following their surprise defeat in the 1945 general election and what it was seen to 
represent. In this respect, one might argue that the combined weakening of the faith in 
Keynesianism, the economic crisis which engulfed the UK and the questioning of the viability of the 
post-war settlement were the initiators of Thatcherism. However, those who tried to initiate what 
we now see as Thatcherism in the early to late 1970s were hampered by both the architecture of 
state at that time and the difficulties associated with launching any new idea. Such path 
dependencies can be seen in the initial attempts amongst the Treasury to persist with Keynesianism, 
since these were seen as the mechanism through which the economy was managed. The ideas which 
the likes of Heath and later Callaghan tried (with varying degrees of commitment, it ought to be 
noted) simply did not have sufficient popular or institutional support in the period from around 1970 
to 1978. Such a bedrock of support is now seen as key for the promulgation of new ideas (Wuthnow, 
1989, Pierson, 2004:39). However, this period of uncertainty (which one might see as a critical 
                                                          
5
 This is not to suggest that Thatcherism should be simply or most accurately presented as a series of 
interlinked ideas  W for as both academic commentators and some of those involved in the events themselves 
have noted, Thatcherism is as much about mood, beliefs, values and instincts (Sherman, quoted in Ranelagh, 
1991: 71; Hay 1996). 
22 
 
juncture or as a period of equilibrium readjustment) provided an opportunity for nascent ideas 
which had been starting to circulate in the late 1960s to be drawn upon to provide possible solutions 
to the problems faced  W and this tendency grew as the problems persisted and the new ideas spread. 
Such ideas had a rational element in that actors took decisions to explore and promote such ideas, 
but, naturally they were not in total control of how these ideas were used by others or the ends to 
which they were put (Hoskyns, 2000). In this respect Thatcher had a path-shaping influence which 
others before had not enjoyed; the ideas she promoted coincided with a widespread thirst for new 
ideas within policy-making circles (although this took time to take hold, of course) and the voicing of 
a set of popular desires which resonated with these emerging thoughts (see Fieldhouse, 1995: 9).  
 
Bringing Public Behaviours into Focus and Engaging with Crime 
KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŬĞǇĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ
makes policies, and policies make politics ?. As Sanders (2006: 45) notes, the first wave of historical 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĚĞǀŽƚĞůŝƚƚůĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŝŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
social change. In some of our earlier publications on this topic we provided evidence that what 
 ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƚŚŝŶŬ ?ĨĞĞůĂŶĚ do can have huge consequences for political processes. In Farrall 
and Jennings (2012) and Jennings et al (2012), for example, we outline how various government 
policies (chiefly relating to the economy, housing, education and social security) pursued from the 
1980s onwards were associated with rises in crime rates during this and the period up to 2006. 
Crime (see Figure 1 below) had been rising steadily during the 1960s, albeit it from a very low base 
(having not exceeded 1 million recorded crimes per annum until the 1960s). Total recorded crime 
increased from 2.5 million in 1979 to 4.5 million in 1990 (an increase of 179%). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, not all offences saw the same rates of increase (as summarised in Farrall and 
Jennings, 2014). For example, burglary and theft saw dramatic increases, whilst violent and sexual 
offences rose more slowly, but continued to increase into the early 2000s. Notwithstanding these 
subtleties, there is no denying that there was an overall rise in crime throughout the 1980s and into 
the first half of the 1990s. So whilst crime was rising before 1979, the rate of increase picked up 
after the early 1980s and further accelerated in the early 1990s. The steepest rises were in property 
offences and occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding with sharp increases in the level 
of unemployment and inequality. 
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Figure 1. Property Crime Per Capita (Home Office Recorded Statistics, England & Wales and the 
British Crime Survey) 
 
 
Such a dramatic change in crime rates did not go unnoticed by the public. Quite understandably, 
levels of public anxiety about crime (derived from the British Crime Survey) rose. These are plotted 
below in Figure 2. We can detect steady increases in worry about crime throughout the 1980s, 
peaking in 1994 and declining since that point. These mirror the trends outlined above in Figure 1.  
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Figure 2. Percentage worried about crime (British Crime Survey 1982-2009) 
 
The increase in crime appeared to have a number of consequences for some other public attitudes 
too. First there was an increase in the proportion of people wanting increased spending on the 
police and prisons, combined with a decrease in public preferences for spending on social security 
(see Figure 3).
6
 /ƚĂůƐŽĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ŚĂƌĚĞŶ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
proportion of people prepared to see the harsher treatment of suspects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Since 1983, the British Social Attitudes Survey has asked a regular question about the spending priorities of 
ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ P “About items of government spending. Which of these would be your highest priority for extra 
ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? 
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Figure 3. Priorities for extra spending (British Social Attitudes Survey 1983-2010) 
 
So as the consequences of Thatcherite social and economic policies unfolded over time, so public 
attitudes shifted along fairly predictable lines. To what extent did these shifts in public attitudes 
occupy the attention of British government during this period? The proportion of the policy agenda 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨĞĂĐŚƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?ƐSpeech referring to criminal 
justice is plotted in Figure 4. Here we focus on the period between 1970 and 2010. Over this period, 
there was a low level of government attention to criminal justice between the 1970s and early-
1990s, with between 1 and 8 per cent of the content of the policy agenda dedicated to the issue of 
law and order. There was a short-lived upturn in attention (to 10 per cent) in 1979 (the first 
programme of the Thatcher government). However, the most sizeable escalation in concern 
occurrĞĚŝŶƚŚĞDĂũŽƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŽĨKĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂũƵŵƉƚŽ ? ?
ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚŽƚĂůŽĨƚŚĞYƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ?ĨƚĞƌĂďƌŝĞĨůƵůůŝŶĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
1997 and 2000, the amount of policy content in the speech dedicated to crime rose to almost a fifth. 
Through plotting a LOWESS
7
 line of best fit through the data points, it becomes evident that while 
there was an upward trend during the 1970s and 1980s, there was a more pronounced escalation of 
political attention to crime after 1990, which only started to subside in 2005. The period between 
1995 and 2005 therefore observed a greater proportion of the annual government agenda dedicated 
                                                          
7
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to the issue of crime than at any other point since the 1970s (and indeed since the start of the post-
war period). 
 
 
Figure 4 ?WƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽůĂǁĂŶĚĐƌŝŵĞŝŶYƵĞĞŶ ?Ɛ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ?ǁŝƚŚ>Kt^^ůŝŶĞŽĨďĞƐƚĨŝƚ ) 
 
Our time series modelling (see Farrall and Jennings, 2012) shows that changes in the national rate of 
crime were associated with changes in the attention of British government to the issue of crime, 
while public concern about the issue also influenced the policy agenda. From the mid-1990s, just as 
anxiety about crime had reached a peak and as crime started to challenge the economy as the issue 
ƚŚĂƚƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ĨĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?hardly 
unsurprisingly ? became more active in attending to the issue in their annual programme of 
executive and legislative proposals. In summary, there are dynamic and lagged effects at work; over 
time the population responds to rising crime levels (with heightened anxiety) which, in turn, leads to 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽn on crime. In this case, the attention afforded to crime was lagged so much 
that crime was actually on the decrease just as government ratcheted up its own attention on crime.  
 
A number of observations follow from this discussion: 
 
1) The above, taken in toto, suggests that there are long-term causal processes which we need 
to consider in thinking about crime rates in England and Wales (and, perhaps more crucially, 
0
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when thinking about changes in crime rates). As such, crime rates can be seen as the long  W
term outcomes of other processes which were initiated several years before.  
 
2) Public attitudes feed back into political decision making processes, such that what the public 
 ‘ĨĞĞůƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŽƉŝĐ ?ŝŶŽƵƌĐĂƐĞĐƌŝŵĞ )ĐĂŶĂŶĚĚŽĞƐĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƚhinking of 
politicians and policy makers. This processes is likely to be recursive, as Lee (2001: 480-481) 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐǁŚĞŶŚĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂĨĞĂƌŽĨĐƌŝŵĞ ‘ĨĞĞĚ-ďĂĐŬůŽŽƉ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚ 
 
 “ QŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ?ƐǇŵďŝŽƚŝĐĂůůǇƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨǇĐƌŝŵĞĨĞĂƌĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŝƚ ?
ƚŚĂƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŽǀŝĐƚŝŵƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐƚŚĞĐƌŝŵŝŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ĨĞĂƌŽĨ
ĐƌŝŵĞ ?ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐƚo identify fear as a 
legitimate object of governance or governmental regulation; that the techniques of 
regulation imagine particular types of citizens  W fearing subjects; that these attempts to 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶ ‘ĨĞĂƌŽĨĐƌŝŵĞ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŝŶĨŽƌŵƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƌǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞy are indeed fearful; that this 
ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƌǇƚŽ ‘ĨĞĂƌŽĨĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂǁ ŶĚŽƌĚĞƌůŽďďǇĂŶĚƉŽƉƵůŝƐƚ
politicians use this supposed fearing population to justify a tougher approach on crime, a 
point on which they grandstand, and in doing so sensitise citizens to fear once again; and 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƐƉƵƌƐŵŽƌĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŽ ‘ĨĞĂƌŽĨĐƌŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ? ?
 
ƐƐƵĐŚ ? ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŚĂƉĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶǁĂǇs which, we think, have not fully 
been recognised by either historical institutionalists or constructivist institutionalists, who, 
for very good reasons, have tended to focus on political actors as either the initiators of 
change (in that they promote ideas, for example) or as people who respond to institutional 
arrangements conceptualised as political parties, accepted ways of thinking and doing things, 
civil servants, and so on. Or, to quote Hall,  “ QĨŽƌŵĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚ
customary practices that structure the relationships between individuals in the polity and 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?,Ăll, 1992: 96).  
 
 
3) A key observation to emerge from our work is that path-shaping periods can firstly alter path 
dependencies (which is commonly accepted, we think) and secondly (and less immediately 
recognised) not just with regards to the specific arena in which they are promoted, but, over 
time, can have unpredictable cascading effects into both other policy domains and hence 
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back to government actions (via changes in public attitudes), Hay and Farrall, 2001, Farrall 
and Jennings, 2012, Jennings et al 2012.  
 
Given that levels of crime are, in part, the consequence of wider social, economic and political 
structures, the model suggests that, consistent with a wide field of empirical inquiry, changes in 
social and economic structures contribute to changes in levels, forms and experiences of crime and 
victimization. In response, such socio-economic forces can lead, over extended periods of time, to 
calls (from the public and politicians) for new ways of tackling and dealing with crime and its 
perceived causes. In this respect, changes in social and economic policies (even those not directly 
related to crime) may result in underlying changes in behaviour which create further pressure for 
governmental action. There is a complex feedback process where the consequences of public 
policies in one domain can have subsequent effects on society and policy in another. Such policy 
feedback processes can occur in isolation from social change  W such as between the political and 
public agenda, and, say, between media, public and legislative attention. For the issue of crime, 
however, social and economic conditions also prescribe the limits of the sorts of policy responses 
available. Our model, grounded in theories of institutionalism, agenda-setting and policy change, 
provides a means for explaining the rise in crime and of the criminal justice agenda under the 1979 W
97 Conservative governments. It informs representation of the complex interaction between society, 
the economy, policy and politics along the following lines: taking office in 1979, the Conservatives 
responded to growing pressures for economic and social reforms that had emerged in Britain during 
the 1970s through adoption of neo-liberal macro-economic policies as well as embarking on 
widespread privatization of council housing. However, some aspects of their policies only served to 
prolong the economic hardship and augment earlier processes of deindustrialization. Later, neo-
liberal and neo-conservative social policies cascaded through other branches of state activity 
between 1981 and 1989 (Hay and Farrall, 2011) falling most heavily on social security, education and 
local government. This programme of government policies resulted in a shift in the underlying social 
and economic conditions of Britain, in particular in terms of unemployment and inequality. However, 
these policies also had impacts on actual crime levels, contributing to production of a further policy 
problem (rising crime) which was manifested ŝŶƐƵƌǀĞǇƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĨĞĂƌŽĨĐƌŝŵĞĂŶĚŝƚƐ
identification of crime as an important issue facing the country. 
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Thinking About Levels (and Speeds) of Explanation 
When trying to explain social and economic phenomena, analysts must make decisions about the 
level (or levels) of explanation at which they wish to work. In some cases the individual level is 
sufficient; the decision making of burglars (which house is the more attractive proposition, and why 
so?) is arguable best approached by asking burglars themselves why they chose one house over 
another. Alternatively, if explaining why it is that some parts of a particular city are good places to 
 ‘ƐĐŽƌĞ ?ŚĞƌŽŝŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆample, one might wish to work at a meso-level, and to explore the recent 
economic fortunes of that part of the city, which jobs have ceased to exist and so on, and how the 
local residents responded to such losses. If one were instead thinking about the causes of, for 
example, a nation-wide policy of decarceration (whereby a large proportion of serving prison 
ŝŶŵĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚĨƌŽŵƉƌŝƐŽŶĂŶĚĨĞǁĞƌŶĞǁŽŶĞƐ ‘ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŽƉƌŝƐŽŶ )ŽŶĞŵĂǇǁŝƐŚƚŽůŽŽŬ
at national-level sentencing policies, acts of parliament and so on. But of course, this trichotomy is in 
ŵĂŶǇƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐĂĨĂůƐĞŽŶĞ ?ƵƌŐůĂƌƐ ‘ĚŽŶ ?ƚĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐǁŚǇƐŽŵĞĚĞĐŝĚĞ
ƚŽƐƚĂƌƚďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŚŽŵĞĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚůĞǀĞůƐŽĨ
unemployment and the economic needs that brings, or the responses of some communities when 
jobs disappear (such as increased rates of drug addiction). Hence how a burglar decides to select 
which house to steal from is partly a function (albeit a more removed one) of economic conditions in 
their immediate locale. Similarly, the number of people prepared to sell heroin in an area is partly a 
function of how many people want to buy such drugs in that area, and the much wider availability of 
alternative forms of income (be they either legal or illegal). Given that periods of imprisonment 
disrupt legitimate employment careers, the number of those who have little option but to deal in 
drugs is partly also a function of economic processes (driving them and others out of the local 
economy) and penal policies (which may operate to make some individuals less likely to be recruited 
by employers looking for those with reputable pasts and the requisite skills). So these different 
 ‘ůĞǀĞůƐ ?ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞĚŽǁŶŽŶĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌǁŚĞŶǁĞƐƚĂƌƚƚŽƚŚŝŶŬĂbout both causes and the causes of 
ĐĂƵƐĞƐ ?EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƵƐĞĨƵůǁĂǇŽĨƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐĞŶƋƵŝƌŝĞƐĂŶĚĂƌĞĂŶĂŝĚƚŽ
interpretation, we would argue.  
All of this ďĞŐƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ‘when thinking and analysing a project as complex as the one which we 
have set ourselves, which level (or levels) of explanation are the most appropriate ? ?Our answer is 
that, in order to understand to its fullest extent both Thatcherism and its impact on crime in England 
and Wales, we need to think about all of these levels, and some additional ones too. The swing 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŶŽǁƚŚŝŶŬŽĨĂƐ ‘dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌŝƐŵ ?ďǇƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞWĂƌƚǇǁĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ
which has been detected as starting in the 1950s (Green, 1999). Thus we need to acknowledge the 
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role of individuals and small collections of individuals from the 1950s through to the 1970s and 
beyond in the build up to the policies of the 1980s. Similarly, we cannot for one moment ignore the 
global crisis of the early 1970s (often referred to as the oil crisis )ǁŚŝĐŚŝĨŶŽƚ ‘ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽƐƚ-ǁĂƌĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ? ?ŝƚƐĞůĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƐŽŵĞŶĞǀĞƌĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ
its basic premise, Green 1999) certainly focused minds on it more than they may have been before. 
In addition to tŚĞƐĞ ‘ůĞǀĞůƐ ? ?ǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽůŽĐĂƚĞĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌŝƐŵĂƐďŽƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨ
specific challenges to the UK, and part of a wider swing towards neo-liberal and neo-conservative 
governments in the late 1970s and early 1980s (in the US and Canada most obviously, but also in 
West Germany, Australia and New Zealand, see Taylor, 1990). Within each of these countries 
particular individuals played key roles developing critiques (see above) and later policies which were 
pursued (to varying degrees) by the likes of Thatcher, Reagan and Kohl. Key interests groups 
emerged during these periods and they too played roles in shaping policies and reflecting and 
ŵŽƵůĚŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝŶŐĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ĂůƐŽƉůĂǇĞĚĂŚƵŐĞƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĞ
matters too; they voted for such parties and their opinions started to feedback (via surveys) into 
thinking by politicians in government and in opposition. As such, our project has had to grapple with 
various and varying levels of explanation. At times public opinions are crucial in our story; at other 
times what key individuals in positions of political power did (or did not do) was key; at other points 
we can see the legacy of previous ideas and systems of thought working they way through how 
current problems were approached, thought about and responded to.      
Another consideration needs to be given attention too, however. Ours is a project which could be 
approached with a focus on just the period between 1979 and 1990 (or 1997). However, to do this 
would be to fail to locate crime, policies about crime, other social and economic policies, the 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞWĂƌƚǇ ? ‘dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚĂǁŚŽůĞƌĂĨƚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌŬǇŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽƉĞƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚ ?tŚŝůƐƚ
this project is a heady mix of a criminological focal point seen (partly) through the lenses of political 
science, it is also a project which is steeped in historical insight. This, for us, means not just thinking 
about levels of explanation, but also about speeds of explanations too ? ‘^ƉĞĞĚƐ ?ŝƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞly plural 
here, for no two processes run at exactly the same speed. Let us take, as an example, the 1988 
Education Reform Act. This act first came into being in the mid to late 1980s, as the Conservative 
Party started to look ahead (in 1986) to an anticipated third electoral victory (which came in 1987). 
WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ůŝƚƚůĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶƐĂŝĚĂďŽƵƚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶďǇdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĞƐ(despite her 
having been secretary for education in the 1970 government). In 1986, there was a marked shift in 
thinking, as ŶĞǁƌŝŐŚƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĐĂŵĞƚŽĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
schooling (Tomlinson 1989: 183). Indications of this shift in thinking came during the 1987 Election, 
when it was announced that if the Tories were re-elected, schools would ďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽ ‘ŽƉƚŽƵƚ ?ŽĨ
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Local Education Authority (LEA) control (Whitty and Menter 1989: 47). The resulting 1988 Education 
Reform Act was radically to change secondary education in the United Kingdom. The 1988 Education 
Reform Act fully came into power on the 1st of April, 1990. This act allowed schools to opt out of LEA 
control, ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƐĐŚŽŽůƐĨƌŽŵ>ƐƚŽƐĐŚŽŽůŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌƐ ?ĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ŽƉĞŶ
ĞŶƌŽůŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŽĨĨĞƌĞĚĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƐĐŚŽŽůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ )ĂŶĚŝŶƚƌŽĚuced the 
National Curriculum (Dorey 1999: 146). Whilst, previously, education had been a low priority for the 
government (McVicar 1990: 138), the aim of the 1988 act was to make a radical break with the 
earlier philosophy (Tomlinson 1989: 185 W6). Staff Wstudent ratios rose throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, arguably leading to greater disruption in classes, more exclusions and greater levels of staff 
absenteeism. In 1992, the first league tables of school exams were published (Timmins 2001: 519). 
These had the unfortunate side effect of encouraging schools to exclude unruly children (school 
exclusions rose throughout the 1990s until reaching a peak of 12,668 in 1996 W97; DFeS 2001). 
Dumped on the streets, excluded children only served to cause further problems for local residents 
and the police (Timmins 2001: 566). Interestingly, Bynner and Parsons (2003: 287) show that those 
in school between 1975 and 1986 had twice the rate of temporary suspensions (15 per cent for 
males and 6 per cent for females) as the generation of children before them (7 per cent for males 
and 3 per for females). So one of the upshots of this act was that an increasing number of children 
were excluded from schools, and this was associated with increases in low level but persistent anti-
social behaviour in the mid-1990s. Thus decisions taken in the mid-1980s took a decade or so to 
produce outcomes which were related to crime. Alternatively, as Thompson (2014) shows, 
Conservative economic policies (inspired by monetarism) had much more immediate effects on 
businesses (so much so that monetarism ceased to be pursued as a policy from around March 1981, 
due to its negative impacts on businesses, Thompson, 2014: 39).     
In this respect, when thinking about why Thatcherism emerged when it did and the impacts which it 
might have had on crime in England and Wales, several different processes were unfolding at 
different times and at different speeds. Some of the slowest moving and longest processes relate to 
the sentiments of sections of the Tory Party after the 1945 general election defeat and the eventual 
resurfacing of these in the early 1970s. This set of instincts and beliefs took time to be shaped into 
political ideas and still longer to develop an institutional basis from which they could be articulated 
and (if and when needed) defended.  Nevertheless, these eventually started to form sufficient 
critical mass to make electoral change a possibility and, once the ideas had been fully worked 
though into policy proposals, to start to make decisive in-roads into the foundations of the post-war 
consensus. Some of the changes undertaken by the early Thatcher governments (as these worked 
their ways through various sections of government policy-making, see Hay and Farrall, 2011) initially 
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altered, for example, the ownership of housing and the sorts of economic environments people lived 
in. Over time, these started to alter the landscape of crime in England and Wales, and we started to 
see dramatic increases in crime throughout the 1980s and into the early-1990s. As we have argued 
elsewhere, and in the context of New Right thinking, so rises in crime started to be registered with 
members of the public and hence, eventually politicians and then started to form the basis of policy-
formulation. Thus shifts in crime policies in the mid-1990s were the outcomes of changes which can 
be traced in various ways back to seemingly unrelated policy domains and the changes in these in 
turn related to changes in thinking within the Tory Party. The causes appear to have operated in 
causal chains, been long-term, very slow-moving, and incremental.           
One of the central aims of our project is, therefore, to explain how it might be that what happens in 
the policy arena relating to, for example, housing policies, or social security, or unemployment might 
impact on crime rates. This initially sounds rather straightforward; we know there are strong 
relationships between, for example, unemployment and engagement in crime (see Farrington et al 
1986). But our task is slightly more complex, since are not using individual level which allows us to 
ƌĞůĂƚĞĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞůĂďŽƵƌŵĂƌŬĞƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŽĨĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?KƵƌĚĂƚĂ
sets are collected at the individual level (for example via the British Crime Survey, British Social 
Attitudes Survey, Labour Force Survey and so on), but we analyse them as repeated cross-sectional 
data at the social group and regional levels. Thus ours is a project which seeks to explore macro-level 
policies processes at the regional and social subgroup level using data collected from many 
individuals at different points in time. Hence our need to have thought carefully about different 
levels of explanation and the data used to make these assessments.   
Our thinking on this builds on our initial outline of how a Thatcherite influence on crime emerged 
ƐůŽǁůǇĂŶĚǀŝĂĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌŬĞǇƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?tŚŝůƐƚŵƵĐŚŽĨdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
initial attention was devoted to changes in the economic sphere of government influence (namely 
fiscal policy, monetary policy, and changes to legislation relating to industrial relations) these 
changes increased substantially the numbers of those unemployed in the UK (from an already high 
base it ought to be noted). Changes in housing policies (also an early target of policy activity for 
dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ )ĂůƐŽƐůŽǁůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞĚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ǁŚŽ ?ůŝǀĞĚǁŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůƐŽĨ
social and economic needs which such people (and hence, communities) experienced. All in all, 
changes in the broad tenor of housing policy, coupled with increases in unemployment and the 
concentrating of social and economic disadvantages associated with deindustrialisation, slowly 
started to have dramatic and enduring impacts on the sorts of crimes which people living in such 
communities started to experience. Such crimes were driven by economic want and were also 
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expressive of frustration and desperation in what may be described in Durkheimian terms (Durkheim, 
1897) ?ƵƚĐƌŝŵĞ ‘ƐƉŝůůƐŽǀĞƌ ?ĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚŝŶƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐ. It does this via the exploitation in 
terms of what is stealable in any one community and hence crime radiates out in a number of ways. 
Those in need of things to steal may start to target other communities where they do not live and/or 
may start to target those commuting around the cities in which they live and of course start to form 
ƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŽĨ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŽǀĞƌƚůǇƌĂĐŝƐƚ )ŵĞĚŝĂĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ
ŽĨůĂǁĂŶĚŽƌĚĞƌ ?, Hall et al, 1978. Such discourses start to enter (along with direct experiences) the 
consciousness of those not immediately affected by high levels of unemployment, poverty and need. 
And so, unemployment whilst fuelling crime directly in some neighbourhoods may start to fuel 
anxiety about crime both in these neighbourhoods and other ones less directly affected.  
But England and Wales is not simply one place with just one economic or one social history; our 
work therefore needs to take seriously not just time but also geography. Not all communities were 
equally affected by the changes brought about to British society by the turbulence of the period 
ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?dŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŚĞĂƌƚůĂŶĚƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶǁŝůůŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƋƵŝƚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
experiences in this regard when compared to those parts of the country which relied less on coal-
mining, steal working or heavy manufacturing. In this respect, ours is a project which explores 
changes over time and between places  W where places refer to large regions. Many of these regions 
were well into a period of deindustrialisation long before 1979 (or even 1973). Crafts and Tomlinson 
(Crafts, 1991, Tomlinson, 1990) have documented the history of economic decline, tracing it back to 
the late-1960s. As such, deindustrialisation already had a hold on the coal-mining regions of Scotland, 
south Wales, the English midlands and northern England. Yet, even so, these regions and the 
communities within them bore the brunt of the economic changes wrought by some Thatcherite 
economic policies, and especially so after the miners lost their year-long strike of 1983-1984 and 
faced the closure of many mines and the loss of many jobs associated with this line of work. The 
southeast of England (with London as its hub) saw changes, but these tended to be in the opposite 
direction, with a booming economy and also a dramatic increase in residents (many of whom had 
left the de-industrialising heartlands of Wales, Scotland and the north of England, Dorling, 2014).  
So how individuals respond to various loses (of identity, community, employment and livelihood) will 
produce outcomes which are felt by other individuals in other communities and regions. In this way 
our use of data which is collected at the individual level but is not longitudinal at the individual level 
becomes less problematic. Similarly, those runs of data which we use (such as inflation or the Gini 
co-efficient) which are processes which are not collected at the individual level are easily embedded 
within our model. Inflation is something which, to some extent, everyone feels. But the degree to 
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which one feels (and indeed is negatively affected by) it is not the same for all individuals. Those 
with more savings, higher salaries and lower outgoings will notice the impacts of inflation less than 
those with little or no savinŐƐŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŽĨĂůůďĂĐŬ ?ůŽǁĞƌƐĂůĂƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐĂƐŬĞĚƚŽ ‘ĚŽŵŽƌĞ ?
ŽƌŽƵƚŐŽŝŶŐƐǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶŶŽƚĞĂƐŝůǇďĞƌĞĚƵĐĞĚĂƚĂůůŽƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞ ?^Ž
again, we have to rely on making the assumption that macro-level processes such as inflation will 
come to bear more heavily on some people in some communities and that some of these people will 
respond in ways which are not totally in keeping with the law.  
We therefore rely on officially recorded data in some instances (especially when these were not 
open to influence by the governments of the day, who might have good reason to alter the 
measurement of some issues, such as the number of people claiming unemployment benefit), and, 
wherever we are able to, seek to augment these with data from people living in the UK during the 
period under question (and collected from surveys both those undertaken by independent bodies 
and those commissioned by governmental agencies). Our modelling strategy relies upon time series 
techniques. We argue that long-term persistence, trends and fluctuations both in crime rates and 
attitudes towards crime and criminal justice are critical for understanding underlying processes of 
social, economic and political change  W with respect to the past and the future. Through 
understanding longitudinal patterns in aggregate-level variables it becomes possible to understand 
how certain social, political and economic forces interact. 
Often, debate in the criminological literature has focused upon the degree to which crime rates 
measured at the aggregate-ůĞǀĞůĞǆŚŝďŝƚƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ‘ŶŽŶƐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ? 
processes).  Notably, however, there has been little discussion of theoretical assumptions relating to 
the time series properties of crime rates (see Jennings et al. 2012). One of the contributions of this 
project will therefore be to theorise the data-generating processes for such aggregate-level 
measures from heterogeneous individual-level behaviour as well as undertaking further diagnostic 
analysis of the characteristics of our time series data. For example, this analysis might seek to 
determine if fear of crime or victimisation are more stable for certain social groups than others. Such 
an approach might use tests for stationarity/non-stationarity or tests for fractional integration. In 
addition, time series methods include multivariate regressions; for example, using autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) models to control for the persistence of the dependent variable, or error-
correction models (ECMs) to test whether a pair of variables remain in a long-run equilibrium and 
move together over time (such as the relationship between crime and unemployment). This will 
build on earlier work that has used a variety of time series models to test the dynamic relationship 
between crime, the economy and politics. The creation of aggregate datasets for different groups is 
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important, since it means that models can be estimated as panels (i.e. as discrete relationships), and 
we can explore whether there is co-variation or a lot of unique variance for each group.  An example 
of a time series model with fear of crime as the dependent variable might therefore be estimated as: 
 
ADL 
FEARt = a0 + B1FEARt-1 + CRIMEt-1 + INEQUALITYt-1 + EVENTt 
 
(Meaning that crime levels and inequality are independent variables and EVENTt is a dummy variable 
indicating the start of a new policy). This strategy allows us to model both macro-level processes 
(such as growing levels of inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient) and regional-level and 
subgroup-level experiences of phenomena such as victimisation (measured by such surveys as the 
BCS and GHS) and worry about crime (measured by similar surveys) and relate these to the 
experiences of people living in various regions in the UK during the period of change we are 
interested in. At no point are we able to model processes at the individual level, but we get as close 
as we can to this by employing data collected at the individual level wherever we can.           
Thus our model of change is a complex one; it needs to be since we are theorising various types of 
change working at different levels and at varying speeds (both varying between one another and 
varying at different points of time). Our model starts with acknowledging the importance of ideas in 
processes of dramatic and far-reaching change. Many of the ideas which Thatcher pursued had been 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŽǀĞƌĂůŽŶŐƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨƚŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚƐĞǀĞƌĂůŚĂĚďĞĞŶƉƵƌƐƵĞĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇďǇďŽƚŚdĞĚ,ĞĂƚŚ ?Ɛ
government (1970-1974) and the Labour governments from 1974 to 1979. Such ideas started to be 
developed by various thinkers on the right in and around the Conservative Party, and slowly started 
to be given increasing attention by key actors in the news media and amongst various right-leaning 
think tanks and academics (Hall, 1992). Whilst it would be wrong to say that these ideas became 
 ‘ůŽĐŬĞĚŝŶ ? ?ŝŶĂƉĂƚŚĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚǁĂǇ ) ?ƚŚĞƐĞŝĚĞĂƐǁŽƵůĚĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ
both opinion-shapers and amongst the population. These ideas reflected various popular sentiments 
concerning the economic and social problems facing the country at that time, and were equally to 
mould some of these in particular directions. After Thatcher won the 1979 general election these 
ideas started to be promulgated in more depth and yet more institutions started to pay heed to 
them. As Thatcher outlined her policies and made statements on various topics, so public opinion 
was further shaped (either recoiling from in some instances or moving to embrace in others). As the 
effects of the initial policies being pursued started to become seen, so public opinion was shifted in 
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various ways again. The effects of the policies on some sections of society were recognised by both 
members of the public and those in government and in Whitehall. This brought about modifications 
to the policies in order for the party to remain in power. Over time the policies being pursued 
ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ďĞĚĚŽǁŶ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?ďŽƚŚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇĂŶĚĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůǇ )ŽŶƚŚĞůŝǀĞƐŽĨĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?
Large scale confrontations with key power blocs (such as the trade union movement) served to 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ W which was also starting to win admirers 
both at home and overseas (certainly support from US President Reagan did nothing to harm her). 
LikeminĚĞĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂŶĚƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐDĂƌǇtŚŝƚĞŚŽƵƐĞ ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů>ŝƐƚĞŶĞƌƐĂŶĚ
Viewers Association) provided further institutional support for Thatcherite ideas and sentiments. As 
the outcomes of the policies started to emerge, and as the Conservatives got better at controlling 
and influencing the machinery of government, so new policy areas were initiated (often with help 
from thinkers in pressure groups). Institutions were discarded, embraced, modified and promoted in 
various degrees and to various effects. One of the eventual outcomes for crime rates was that they 
started to rise. These had been rising anyway since the 1960s, but with the advent of new research 
techniques and ways of gauging popular opinion (such as the BCS, BSAS and their adoption into the 
institutional culture of valid sources of  ‘ƚŚŝŶŐƐǁĞŬŶŽǁĂďŽƵƚĐƌŝŵĞ ? )ƐƵĐŚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞƚŽ
increasingly play a part in government thinking about crime. Crime rates, as we have shown 
previously, are the result of numerous processes (unemployment, economic need and the such like) 
and various institutions started to reflect on what these meant. The media (always on the lookout 
for bad news, since this sells) started to report stories about the general crime rate rather than 
specific crimes or groups of possible offenders (Hall et al 1978) and slowly the problem of crime 
became something about which it was no longer enough simply for Conservative politicians to talk 
about  W something had to be done since the opinion polls and the popular press had spotted this 
rising trend in crime. This meant legislation and shifts in sentencing policies (since up-tariffing was 
closer to Conservative instincts than were models of intervention based on social work, for example). 
This created a re-moulding of the criminal justice system after the early 1990s; prior to that point 
with crime rising but hardly a major issue, the Labour Party in disarray generally ĂŶĚƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘ǁĞĂŬ ?
ŽŶĐƌŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĨŝƌƐƚƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŶŝŶĚƵƐƚrial 
relations, social security reform and then educational reform there was little time to be devoted to 
crime and Home Secretaries were left alone to get on with it (Hurd, 2003). The institutions which 
ǁĞƌĞĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚǁĞƌĞŵĂŶǇĂŶĚǀĂƌŝĞĚ ? ‘/ŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ǁas clearly one institution which was affected 
by this as more prisons were built. Our earlier analyses have suggested that whilst imprisonment did 
play a part in the decline in crime rates (see Farrall and Jennings, 2012, Jennings et al 2012) so too 
did the improvement in the economy. However, it has been (at least in popular discourse) the idea 
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ŽĨŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐƵƌĞ ?ĨŽƌŚŝŐŚĐƌŝŵĞƌĂƚĞƐ ?dŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇ
shifted its position on crime after Tony Blair become shadow Home Secretary in 1992 and the party 
ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĂŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞ ‘ƚŽƵŐŚ-ŵŝŶĚĞĚ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶĐƌŝŵĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚŽďĞĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞ
strongly promoted after Blair become party leader in 1994). Since that point, no serious politician in 
the UK has ever allowed an opponent to be further to the right than they are when it comes to the 
issue of crime (Skogan, 2009: viii).   
 
Conclusion 
We have sought to outline our thinking on a very large and complex undertaking; namely the 
assessment of the ways in which the Thatcher governments of the 1980s may have had quite 
unintended consequences on crime via some of the policies which they set about pursuing for quite 
separate reasons, but which, nevertheless contributed to amongst other things, the upswing in 
crime in the 1980s. Our thinking is not heavily informed by theories commonly examined by 
criminologists; instead our thinking about both the causal antecedents of these governments and 
their approach to re-engineering society, and the causal antecedents of crime are informed by 
thinking inspired by historical institutionalist scholars writing within political science, and sociological 
and economic theories of crime causation.       
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